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DESIGNATION OF THE PARTIES 
The Plaintiffs-Appellees WESLEY CLOCK and ANNE 
CLOCK are natural persons, husband and wife, and 
purchasers of real property pursuant to a written 
"lease-option" agreement with the Defendants-Appellants 
JOHN F GREEN and LARUE GREEN, natural persons, husband 
and wife, as sellers thereto. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
Jurisdiction of this Court is granted pursuant to 
the provision of Section 78-2a-3(2)(j), Utah Code, and 
the "pour over" Order of the Utah Supreme Court, dated 
as of 2 March 1999, transferring this case to the Court 
of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This appeal and the predicate factual and legal 
situation in which is arose presents the following 
issues: 
1. Whether the trial court misinterpreted 
the contract and/or misapplied the law in 
enforcing the same, by failing to give any 
effect to the "selling price of $81,5000 at 10 
1/2% interest" clause concerning the purchase 
price if and when the "option" was actually 
exercised and which characterized the purchase 
transaction as "a loan". 
4 
2. Whether the trial court erred in failing 
to take into account the provisions of 
Sections 15-1-1, 15-1-3 and 15-1-4, Utah Code, 
which require the assessment of interest on 
judgments, especially when the contract upon 
which the judgment was based provides for 
"interest", at a stated amount, on the 
forbearance transaction which was 
characterized as a "loan". 
The construction and interpretation of an 
unambiguous, written contract is a matter of law, to be 
decided by the court. Kimball vs Campbell, 699 P. 2d 714 
(Utah Supreme Court 1985); Morris vs Mountain States 
Telephone and Telegraph Company, 658 P.2d 1199 (Utah 
Supreme Court 19 83). 
Whether the terms of a contract are ambiguous is 
a question of law. Wade vs Stangl, 869 P. 2d 9, 12 (Utah 
Court of Appeals 1994) ; Equitable Life & Casualty 
Insurance Company vs Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah 
Court of Appeals 1993), cert denied 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 
Supreme Court 1993). 
Whether the trial court properly interpreted an 
unambiguous contract is a question of law. Allstate 
Insurance Company vs Liberty Mutual Insurance Group, 
868 P.d 110, 112 (Utah Court of Appeals 1994); LMV 
5 
Leasing, Incorporated vs Conlin, 805 P. 2d 189, 192 
(Utah Court of Appeals 1991). 
Whether the trial court properly interpreted (or 
applied) a statute is a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. Ong International (U.S.A.), Incorporated 
vs 11th Avenue Corporation, 850 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah 
Supreme Court 1993); Bennion vs Graham Resources, 
Incorporated, 849 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah 1993); Jacobsen 
Investment Company vs State Tax Commission, 83 9 P.2d 
789, 790 (Utah Supreme Court 1992). 
A trial court's conclusions of law in civil cases 
are reviewed for correctness. Wade vs Stangl, 869 P. 2d 
9, 12 (Utah Court of Appeals 1994); Allstate Insurance 
Company vs Liberty Mutual Insurance Group, 868 P. 2d 
111, 112 (Utah Court of Appeals 1994);. 
This standard of review has also been referred to 
as a "correction of error standard". Jacobsen 
Investment Company vs State Tax Commission, 83 9 P. 2d 
789, 790 (Utah Supreme Court 1992); Sanders vs Ovard, 
838 P.2d 1134, 1135 (Utah Supreme Court 1992); 
Commercial Union Associates vs Clayton, 863 P. 2d 29, 36 
(Utah Court of Appeals 1993). "Correction of error" 
means that no particular deference is given to the 
trial court's ruling on questions of law. Provo River 
Water Users7 Association vs Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 931 
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(Utah Supreme Court 1993); Higgins vs Salt Lake County, 
855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah Supreme Court 1993). The 
"correction of error" standard means that the appellate 
court decides the matter for itself and does not defer 
in any degree to the trial judge's determination of 
law. State vs Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah Supreme 
Court 1993); Howell vs Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 
(Utah Court of Appeals 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In July 1991 the Plaintiffs Wesley Clock and Anne 
Clock, husband and wife, as purchasers [hereinafter 
sometimes referred to as "the Buyers"] negotiated 
with the Defendants John Green and LaRue Green, 
husband and wife, as sellers [hereinafter sometimes 
referred to as "the Sellers"] for the "option" 
purchase of a parcel of improved residential property 
located in Salt Lake County. A one-page, hand-written 
agreement, consisting of a single paragraph of text, 
was prepared and signed by the parties. The "option" 
Agreement [hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the 
Agreement"] contained certain "lease-purchase" 
provisions under which the Buyers were allowed to 
reside on the premises. 
The 1991 hand-written "Agreement" in its entirety 
provides: 
7 
7-29-1991 
I Wesley Clock and Anne Clock agree to pay 
$675.00 per month Plus Sewer and water. There 
is a $350.00 deposit plus $1,000 for a lease 
option to buy. Starting July 29, 1991 prorated 
to Aug. 4, 1991, the selling price to be 
$81500 at 10 1/2% interest. When option is 
picked up, the $350.00 plus the $1,000.00 will 
be applied to the down Payment of $5/000 or 
more. The Seller will re-roof and make the 
carport into a double garage, replace the back 
door. Other than the things above, the Clocks 
will take care of any repairs during the 
option period. There will be a balloon payment 
due on the balance of the loan Aug 5, 1996. 
The rent to be pro-rated from July 29, 1991 to 
Aug 4, 1991. Rent to begin on Aug 5, 1991. 
August 2, $500.00; Aug 5, $700.00. Balance by 
Aug 20, 1991. If the Clocks do not buy they 
will be renters and Money will not be 
refunded. 
Is/ Anne Clock 
/s/ Wesley Clock 
/s/ John F. Green 
/s/ LaRue Green 
Emphasis added. [RECORD at 0005 and 0042.] [A photocopy 
of the Agreement is included herein as ADDENDUM #1.] 
Pursuant to the "rental" provisions of the 
Agreement, the Greens (as Sellers) allowed the Clocks 
(as purchasers) to reside in the premises. During the 
period 1991 to 1996, the Clocks "paid rent" to the 
Greens. In April 1996 the Clocks notified the Greens 
that they (the Clocks) intended to exercise the 
"option" for the purchase of the real estate. [RECORD 
at 0007.] The Greens citing the Clocks' failure to 
make the required "down payment" in a timely fashion 
and the Clocks' non-compliance with other provisions of 
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the contract refused to convey title to the real 
estate, said refusal thus precipitating the instant 
litigation. 
The District Court initially adjudicated the case 
pursuant to jointly-filed motions for summary judgment. 
The Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the basis 
of their averments that they (as Buyers) had presented 
a notice of intent to exercise the "option" within a 
timely fashion. [RECORD at 0019 thru 0026; 0058 thru 
0063.] The Defendants moved for summary judgment in 
their favor on the basis that the Plaintiffs' 
notification was defective, in that the Plaintiffs were 
in breach of the agreement because they had failed to 
make the required down payment and because the option 
was not exercised in a timely manner. [RECORD at 003 0 
thru 0042.] 
The specific issue of the price to be paid as 
required by the "at 10 1/2% interest" phrase was NOT 
directly raised or adjudicated. The District Court 
ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs. [RECORD at 0068 thru 
0069.] The Defendants appealed the 1996 judgment. 
[RECORD at 0074-0075.] The Utah Supreme Court "poured-
over" [RECORD at 0077] the appeal to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, which issued an unpublished opinion, affirming 
the District Court's judgment in favor of the 
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Plaintiffs (purchasers). [RECORD at 81-82.] [A copy of 
the original "MEMORANDUM DECISION" of the Court of 
Appeals is attached hereto as APPENDIX 3.] The Utah 
Supreme Court ultimately denied the Defendant's 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari. [RECORD at 83.] 
Following the filing of the first appeal, the 
Plaintiffs (as purchasers) took no action to comply 
with provisions of the agreement concerning the 
exercise of the "option" and/or the Court's judgment 
upholding the option and its exercise. The Plaintiffs 
tendered no money to the Defendants, although they 
continued to reside upon the premises. 
On remand, the District Court over the objection 
of the Defendants (sellers) entered judgment against 
the Defendants, ordering them to convey to the Buyers 
the real estate, at the purchase price of $81,500. 
[RECORD at 115-116.] [A photocopy of the 1998 "JUDGMENT 
AND ORDER" is included herewith as ADDENDUM 4.] The "at 
10 1/2% interest" clause (pertaining to the purchase 
price) was given NO EFFECT by the trial court. This 
latter judgment which is the basis of the instant 
appeal failed to take into account the provisions of 
agreement concerning the "at 10 1/2% interest" as such 
affected (i.e. increased). The District Court also 
seemingly ignored the contractual provisions 
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characterizing the purchase transaction as a "loan". 
The judgment also failed to take into account the 
provisions of Sections 15-1-1 and 15-1-4, Utah Code, 
pertaining to the assessment of any interest. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Defendants' arguments are summarized as follows: 
1. The "selling price of $81,500 at 10 1/2% 
interest" (emphasis added) is clear on its 
face of the Agreement. Given the long-standing 
rules of contract construction, this 
unambiguous phrase must be given some meaning. 
The ONLY meaning and application attributable 
thereto is that the purchase price was to 
increase at the rate of 10 1/2% per year. The 
physical placement of the phrase within the 
Agreement tends to that conclusion; the 
grammatical and syntax connection of the 
phrase to the "selling price" leads to that 
single conclusion. The trial court ignored the 
provision and awarded judgment without 
reference thereto. The Plaintiffs-Appellants 
(now standing to reap an unintended windfall) 
desire to have the Court ignore and disregard 
the provision. But the written text is there; 
it cannot be ignored or explained away. Its 
ll 
import must be incorporated into the 
judgments. 
2. In similar vein, the trial court ignored 
the pertinent Utah statutes which require that 
judgments bear interest conforming to the 
written agreements upon which those judgments 
are based. The entered-judgment (upon which 
this appeal is based) is absolutely void of 
any provision which adheres to the statutory 
mandate. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY 
THE "AT 10 1/2% INTEREST" PROVISIONS 
OF THE AGREEMENT RELATING TO THE SELLING PRICE 
The first source of inquiry in a contract 
interpretation case is the document itself, considered 
in its entirety. Hal Taylor Associates vs Unionamerica, 
Incorporated, 657 P.2d 743 (Utah Supreme Court 1982); 
Larrabee vs Royal Dairy Products Company, 614 P. 2d 160 
(Utah Supreme Court 1980). In interpreting the terms 
of a contract, the reviewing court must look to the 
agreement as a whole and to the circumstances, nature 
and purpose of the contract. Utah State Medical 
Association vs Utah State Employees Credit Union, 655 
P. 2d 543 (Utah Supreme Court 1982) . The contract should 
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be interpreted so as to harmonize all of its 
provisions. Jones vs Hinkle, 611 P. 2d 733 (Utah Supreme 
Court 1980) . If possible, ALL of the terms of the 
contract should be given effect. G.G.A., Incorporated 
vs Leventis, 773 P. 2d 841 (Utah Court of Appeals 1987) ; 
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company vs Salt Lake City, 
740 P.2d 1357 (Utah Court of Appeals 1987), certiorari 
denied 765 P.2d 1277. 
In the case at bar, there are at least FOUR EXPRESS 
PROVISIONS which clearly indicate that the agreement 
was to bear interest: 
1. The purchase price provision states: "the 
selling price to be $81,500 at 10 1/2% 
interest" .•. 
2. There is to be a "down payment of $5,000 
or more" to be paid; 
3. There is to be a "balloon payment"; and 
4. The "balloon payment" is to be "due on 
the balance of the loan". 
From the text of the agreement itself, it clearly 
appears the parties to the transaction contemplated a 
"loan"-type transaction. And "loans" almost-universally 
contemplate and, as in this case, SPECIFY the 
payment of interest against the loaned amount, 
particularly when the contract says it so clearly! 
[We are NOT here dealing with an "ambiguity" 
situation. The "10 1/2% interest" in connection with 
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the "selling price" is unquestionably clear; it has but 
one interpretation. The Buyers have advanced no 
contradictory, reasonable meaning, interpretation or 
application for the phrase "at 10 1/2% interest". Thus, 
the rules of construction for "ambiguities" do NOT come 
into play in the instant analysis.] 
A 
The Buyers have vigorously contested their desire 
to enforce the "option" according to its terms, but now 
seek to have the Court ignore as the trial court did-
--the "interest" provisions applicable to the 
transaction. 
If the phrase "the selling price to be $81500 at 
10 1/2% interest" doesn't mean that the selling price 
is to increase as the Sellers so contend on an 
annual basis, then what possible meaning does the 
phrase "at 10 1/2% interest" mean? The Buyers advance 
no reasonable interpretation,- they merely choose to 
ignore the phrase. However, disregarding the phrase 
does violence to the long-established rules of contract 
interpretation: that ALL the provisions of the contract 
be given meaning. 
The trial court refused to give the phrase any 
meaning. [Even if the trial court refused to give the 
provision meaning during the "option period" (i.e. 1991 
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to 1996) , there has to be at least some period of time 
when the phrase has some effect. The case is almost 
THREE YEARS AFTER the "option" has been "exercised". 
Yet the Buyers have yet to fully tender the purchase 
price! Even if the Court were to ignore the accrual of 
interest during the 5-year option period (which, for 
reasons outlined below, is contrary to the intentions 
of the parties), the Court must as a minimum 
recognize that the contract provided for "10 1/2% 
interest" following the exercise of the option. 
Otherwise, the Buyers achieve an interest-free loan for 
a three-year period or longer. 
It is also incongruous to expect that the "at 10 
1/2% interest" phrase applies to interest against the 
selling price AFTER the "option" has been exercised. If 
the "option" is properly exercised, the real estate is 
promptly purchased and the Sellers are promptly paid: 
there is no realistic opportunity for interest to ever 
accrue (at least in meaningful amounts). Thus, the "at 
10 1/2% interest" phrase was not contemplated by the 
parties for the "post-exercise" situation; the only 
other situation in which the phrase has any meaning or 
application is those "pre-exercise" situations the 
situations in which the option is not exercised for a 
considerable time following the execution of the 
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original contract. That is exactly what we have here 
and that is exactly why the trial court should have 
included the "interest" in the judgment(s) ordering the 
sale. 
That the parties agreed to the "10 1/2 interest" 
to be applied to the "selling price", as applied from 
the very beginning, can be discerned from the conduct 
of the parties as well as the face of the document. If, 
as the Buyers assert, the phrase has NO MEANING or 
application (either pre-1996 or post-1996), then why 
would the Sellers go to such extent to put the 
provision in the contract, directly tied to the 
purchase price? What possible other meaning any 
meaning can the provision have? Why would the 
Sellers so seemingly concerned about every dollar 
involved in the transaction that the parties "prorate" 
the "rents" down to a five-day period, which apparently 
increase from $500 per month (if paid on August 2nd) to 
$700 (if paid on August 5th)? Why would the parties 
and particularly the Sellers worry about specifying 
that the back door is to be repaired (at an undisclosed 
price, but arguably measured at most in the couple 
hundred dollar range), and then literally give away 
tens of thousands of dollars in an interest-free 
"loan", for as long as five years (as the trial court 
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originally ruled) and an ADDITIONAL THREE YEARS as the 
Buyers would have the Court now rule? [Against the 
$81,500 "selling price", the "10 1/2% interest" for a 
single year is approximately $8500; for the three years 
1996 to 1999, the post-judgment interest accruing 
against the "selling price" which still has NOT YET 
BEEN PAID is in excess of $25,000! And that's $25,000 
the Buyers don't want to pay! But its $25,000 that the 
contract obligates them to pay. If the contract is not 
so interpreted, then the rule of construction that "ALL 
provisions of the contract" are to be given meaning (as 
per Leventis, supra, and Big Cottonwood, supra,) is 
ignored. 
B 
Another method of approaching the transaction and 
the meaning of the contract and the operative effect 
of its provisions, ALL of them would be to engage in 
a couple of hypothetical examples which illustrate, in 
principle, the "at 10 1/2% interest" provision 
applicable to the "selling price". 
Hypothetical #1: The "option" is exercised 
a mere two months after the contract is 
signed. In this case, the purchase price is 
essentially the $81,500 specified; the 10 1/2% 
interest for 60 days is relatively minor. The 
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Sellers get the $81,500, which they then can 
invest at prevailing "market rates" and 
"life goes on" ! But their investment continues 
to earn money. 
Hypothetical #2: The Buyers exercise the 
"option" a year later. They must pay about 
$90,000 for the real estate. But that's the 
price they'd pay whether they or somebody 
else was renting the property for it anyway, 
because that's what "the market" would demand! 
Hypothetical #3 : In this example, the Buyers 
don't exercise the option for five years and 
don't pay anything for three years afterward! 
[That's what has factually happened and 
continues to happen, even now!] The Buyers 
then purchase the residence in 1999 using 
1999 "dollars" for a purchase price set in 
1991. It doesn't make sense! And not only does 
it not make sense; such a result which is 
what the Buyers now want goes against the 
face of the very contract they seek to have 
enforced! [Under this "hypothetical", the 
Sellers lose $60, 000+, over an 8-year period! ] 
Inflation (albeit in moderate rates) and 
appreciation of real estate in the Salt Lake Valley 
18 
have been a "fact of life" so long with the 
metropolitan Salt Lake City area that it is almost 
counter-intuitive to deny their existence! That same 
inflation and/or real estate appreciation could almost 
be "judicially noticed". Why, then, is it so difficult 
to factor such into the actual "selling price", when 
the same is EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR IN THE FACE OF THE 
AGREEMENT? 
The phrase "selling price at 10 1/2% interest" must 
be given meaning. The only reasonable meaning from 
the text itself and from the parties own external 
conduct is that it refers to the annual rate of 
interest at which the "loan" was to be paid by the 
Buyers. It can have no other reasonable meaning. 
IF the Buyers are able to advance an interpretation 
to the "10 1/2% interest" phrase (as connected to the 
selling price) , we have the result that they are 
allowed to purchase now, in 1999 the real estate 
for the price it would have sold for in 1991! The 
phrase is simply ignored! On the other hand, if the 
Sellers' interpretation is followed, the Sellers 
receive a reasonable return on their investment (i.e. 
forbearance on the "loan"): 10 1/2%. That rate of 
interest is not, per se, unreasonable or unrealistic; 
the "statutory rate" at the time was (and is) 10% [per 
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Section 15-1-1(2) , Utah Code. Thus, had the option been 
exercised a year later (in 1992), the "selling price" 
would be about $90,000. In 1993, it would be another 
"10 1/2%" greater, about $98,500; in 1994, $107,000; 
and so on. In 1999, the purchase price would have been 
in the $130,000-range: again, reflective of the 
inflationary or "appreciation" factors inherent in this 
type of situation. If the Buyers' approach is followed, 
the Sellers must sell in 1999 (or even 1996) at a price 
in 1991 dollars; NO INTEREST is allowed, even though 
the contract clearly provides for such, as tied to the 
"selling price". On the other hand, if the Sellers' 
interpretation is followed, the "selling price" is 
approximately $130,000. Is such fair? Yes! Is it what 
the contract, on its face, provides? Yes! Is it what 
the parties reasonably agreed to? Yes! 
Where courts have to choose between conflicting 
interpretations to a contract, the interpretation which 
will bring an equitable result will be preferred over 
one which brings about an inequitable result. First 
Security Bank of Utah, N.A. vs Maxwell, 659 P.2d 1078 
(Utah Supreme Court 1983) . The interpretation and 
approach advanced by the Buyers and adopted by the 
trial court leads but to that inequitable result, that 
the Sellers must, in 1999, accept $81,500 when the 
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contract provided they should receive about $13 0,000! 
It's not reasonable to expect that for the mere 
payment of a $1,350 the Buyers would be able to "lock-
in", for a five-year period, the purchase of the real 
estate worth $81,500. The "five-year period" was, as 
the previous decisions have affirmed, for the period in 
which the "option" could be exercised; it is a totally 
different thing to construe the contract to hold the 
"selling price" constant for that entire 5-year (or, as 
the situation has become, 8-year) period! Such flies in 
the face of logic and CONTRADICTS THE CLEAR MEANING OF 
THE WRITTEN TERMS! 
C 
A third approach is to attribute the 10 1/2% 
interest to those amounts unpaid and thus accruing 
interest from the 1996 "judgment" first entered by 
the trial court, as to when the "option" was first 
exercised. [In the intervening three years since that 
exercise, the amount of the "interest" is substantial: 
in excess of $25,000.] 
D 
In addition to the "contract" requirements, the 
Court should impose the stated (and agreed-upon) 
interest rate upon the unpaid balance (from the time 
the option was exercised), as is required by statute, 
21 
as explained in Point II, below. 
II 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO PROVIDE 
FOR INTEREST ON THE JUDGMENT RESULTING FROM THE 
PROVISIONS OF THE CONTRACT OR UNDER THE UTAH STATUTE 
It is without dispute that from 1991 to when the 
"option" would be "exercised", the Sellers would 
"forebear" in the receipt of monies as proceeds from 
the sale of the home. 
Section 15-1-1, Utah Code, provides: 
(1) The parties to a lawful 
contract may agree upon any rate of 
interest for the loan or forbearance 
of any money, goods or chose in 
action that is the subject of their 
contract. 
(2) Unless parties to a lawful 
contract specify a different rate of 
interest, the legal rate of interest 
for the loan or forbearance of any 
money, goods, or chose in action 
shall be 10% per annum. 
Section 15-1-3, Utah Code, provides: 
Whenever in any statute or deed, or 
written or verbal contract, or in any public 
or private instrument whatever, any certain 
rate of interest is mentioned and no period of 
time is stated, interest shall be calculated 
at the rate mentioned by the year. 
Emphasis added. 
In the instant situation, the "lease-option" 
agreement specifies "10 1/2% interest". It is 
reasonable to construe the contract that the "selling 
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price" is to be adjusted by that amount. [Whether the 
transaction is also characterized as a "loan" probably 
doesn't matter. What does matter is that the Agreement 
clearly contains the provision and, in light of the 
contract construction principles identified in Point I, 
above, the provision MUST BE GIVEN SOME MEANING AND 
EFFECT!] 
Section 15-1-4, Utah Code, provides: 
(1) Any judgment rendered on a lawful 
contract shall conform to the contract and 
shall bear interest agreed upon by the 
parties, which shall be specified in the 
judgment. 
(2) Other judgments shall bear interest at 
the federal postjudgment interest rate as of 
January 1 of each year, plus 2%. 
Emphasis added. 
The trial judge is required as a matter of law to 
award the statutorily mandated rate of interest, even 
though, with the passage of time, the award has become 
large. Mont Trucking, Incorporated vs Entrada 
Industries, Incorporated, 802 P.2d 779 (Utah Court of 
Appeals 1990) . Interest is allowed on debts overdue, 
even in the absence of a statute or contract providing 
therefor. Wasatch Mining Company vs Crescent Mining 
Company, 7 Utah 8, 24 Pac. 586 (Utah Supreme Court 
1890), affirmed 151 US 317, 38 L.Ed. 177 (1894). Under 
the former provisions of Section 15-1-4 (prescribing 
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the rate at which "judgments shall bear interest" 
unless otherwise agreed by the parties), the interest 
follows the judgment as a matter of law and would be 
collectible even though the judgment did not so 
provide. Dairy Distributors, Incorporated vs Local 97 6, 
Western Conference of Teamsters, 16 Utah 2d 85, 3 96 
P.2d 47 (1964). Where no tender of payment was made, 
interest accrued on a money judgment during the 
pendency of a federal appeal and during efforts to 
obtain further review by the United States Supreme 
Court. Woodmont, Incorporated vs Daniels, 290 F.2d 186 
(10th Circuit 1961). 
The decision of the Utah Supreme Court in the case 
of Dairy Distributors, Incorporated vs Local Union 97 6, 
Joint Council 87, Western Conference of Teamsters, 3 96 
P. 2d 47 (Utah Supreme Court 1964) , is directly on point 
and to be controlling. In Dairy Distributors the Utah 
Supreme Court wrote: 
Defendants appeal, contending that the 
prior judgment, having been appealed and 
affirmed by this court had become final, and 
that the district court was thereafter without 
authority to change it. We have no doubt 
about the correctness of the general rule that 
when a judgment has become final, the court is 
without authority to change it. However, an 
examination of the authorities cited by the 
defendants will disclose that they do not 
apply to situations such as the Instant one, 
where there was merely a correction of an 
inadvertent omission. Reece v. Knott, 3 Utah 
451, 24 P. 757; Nichols v. Union Pac. Railway 
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Co., 7 Utah 510, 27 P. 693; DaRouch v. 
District Court, 95 Utah 227, 79 P.2d 1006, 116 
A.L.R. 1147; Lees v. Freeman, 19 Utah 481, 57 
P. 411; Frost v. District Court of the Fifth 
judicial District, 96 Utah 106, 83 P.2d 737; 
Keller v. Chournos, 95 Utah 31, 79 P.2d 86, 
will be found to actually support plaintiff's 
position in recognizing that the interest 
follows the judgment as a matter of law. 
Our statute, Sec. 15-1-4, Utah Code Ann. 
1953, provides that unless otherwise agreed by 
the parties, » * * * judgments shall bear 
interest at the rate of eight per cent per 
annum." This interest follows the judgment as 
a matter of law and would be collectible even 
though the judgment did not so provide. See 
Blair v. Durham, 139 F.2d 260 (6th Circuit 
1943) . The trial court in no way transgressed 
its authority in filling in the omission and 
making the record show what was true under the 
law anyway. Its action was in conformity with 
the well-established precept that mere lapse 
of time will not prevent the court from 
correcting errors or omissions. We so 
recognized in the recent case of Kettner v. 
Snow, 13 Utah 2d 382, 375 P.2d 28, stating 
that " * * * in proper circumstances where the 
interests of justice so require, the court has 
power to act nunc pro tunc, that is, to do an 
act upon one date and make it effective as of 
a prior date. It is recognized that clerical 
errors may be corrected or omissions supplied 
so the record will accurately reflect that 
which in fact took place." To the same effect 
see Cook v. Gardner, 14 Utah 2d 193, 195, 381 
P.2d 78. 
396 P.2d at 48. Emphasis added. 
If the obligation to pay interest follows the 
(first) judgment "as a matter of law", then there 
simply was no need to raise that issue at the first 
appeal. 
When Judge Wilkinson refused in 1998 following 
remand subsequent to the Court of Appeals decision to 
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order the assessment of interest against the purchase 
price to be paid (in 1998), the appealed issue became 
"ripe". 
The irony inherent in the objection of the 
Plaintiffs-Appellees as to the "interest" issue is the 
fact that they struggled so hard to convince the Court 
of Appeals that the "option" contract was enforceable, 
according to its terms. The Court of Appeals accepted 
that argument and so held. Now the Plaintiffs-
Appellants want to ignore the "interest" provisions. 
They (the Plaintiffs) have not been harmed at all. 
They have been allowed since 1991 to live in the 
house, according to the "rental" provisions (i.e. 
payment of $675 per month). Since 1996 they have been 
allowed per the trial court's order to live there 
rent-free, for the last three years! 
In the intervening three years that this case has 
taken "on appeal", what should the purchase price 
actually be? [As the Court interprets a contract "as a 
matter of law", the framing of such a rhetorical 
question to illuminate the relevant considerations 
and issues is nevertheless appropriate.] Whether that 
purchase price reflects the pre-1996 accruing interest 
"at 10 1/2% interest" as the "option" contract clearly 
states is one question. Whether the "interest" 
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applies to post-1996 interest is a second and totally 
different question. The Appellants are entitled to a 
judicial decision on both. 
That Judge Wilkinson of the trial court in 1996 
refused to require interest at the "10 1/2% interest" 
as the contract clearly provides IS an appealable 
issue. [The "judgment" bears interest, "as a matter of 
law", per Dairy Distributors, supra.] That for the 
intervening two years (1996 to 1998) NO interest was 
included in the purchase price (finally paid in 1998, 
but only if Plaintiffs hurry) is presently appealable! 
The issue is not whether the judgment is "personal" 
or for a "sum certain"; this issue is whether the 
provisions of the statute will be followed, by 
incorporating the "10 1/2% interest" which so readily 
appears on the face of the "option" agreement. That's 
the issue. If the "10 1/2% interest" phrase does not 
mean exactly this result, then what does the phrase 
mean? The parties (in 1991) obviously had intended some 
meaning for it! What simply does it mean? The 
Plaintiffs, having prevailed on the enforceability of 
the "option" agreement, cannot now be heard to complain 
if the "option" is enforced according to its clear 
import! 
The instant "appeal" might have the result that the 
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Clocks might have to pay more than the $81,500 price 
they agreed to in 1991, BUT THAT'S BECAUSE THAT IS WHAT 
THE "OPTION" CONTRACT THEY SIGNED SAID WAS TO 
HAPPEN! That the purchase price would increase "at 10 
1/2% interest". 
So when they finally pay in 1999 more than three 
years after the 1996 date (which was the absolute 
latest date contemplated by the parties as to the 
transfer of the parcel), shouldn't the Buyers pay the 
amount they agreed to? The Sellers think so, and have 
filed this appeal to enforce the contract, according to 
its terms. 
It appears that Judge Wilkinson (and perhaps even 
Plaintiffs' counsel) framed up the 1998 "judgment" so 
as to avoid a situation wherein the Greens might refuse 
to sign over the necessary conveyances. The 1998 
judgment doesn't require that they do! The 1998 
"judgment" provides the quiet title vesting upon the 
deposit of the Plaintiffs' monies with Surety Title. 
Those Plaintiffs cannot now be heard to complain about 
"delay" or "clouds on title", because the vesting of 
time is entirely within their control! 
If there is a res judicata or "law of the case" 
concept applicable to the instant situation, it is that 
the Plaintiffs cannot now be heard to complain about 
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the 1998 "judgment". They procured it. They prepared 
it! That "judgment" in procedure and substance was 
obviously designed to supersede and take the place of 
the 19 96 "judgment". 
CONCLUSION 
The "option" Agreement clearly provides for the 
incurring of "10 1/2% interest" against the specified 
"selling price" for the real estate. The ONLY 
reasonable interpretation for the provision is that the 
"selling price" increased, annually, at the "10 1/2% 
interest" amount, until the option was exercised. [The 
option is not fully exercised until the funds for the 
purchase are actually received by the Sellers. Thus, 
due to the fact that the Buyers still have not tendered 
the agreed-upon amount, the "10 1/2% interest" still 
continues to accrue.] 
The relevant Utah statutes require the "judgment" 
to incorporate the "interest rate" stated in the 
"contract" which is the basis for the judgment. Judge 
Wilkinson's judgement does not do this. Accordingly, it 
is the proper subject of an appeal and should be 
corrected. 
The Court of Appeals is entitled AND REQUIRED to 
construe and interpret the written Agreement (and the 
express provisions thereof) "as a matter of law" and 
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without any deference to the trial court's 
interpretation! The Court of Appeals should do so: TO 
GIVE MEANING AND EFFECT to the phrase "selling price of 
$81,500 at 10 1/2% interest". 
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of April, 
1999. 
lEN^QrHX 
Attorney for Appellants 
JOHN F GREEN and 
LARUE GREEN 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I certify that I caused two copies of the foregoing 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF to be mailed, first-class postage 
prepaid, certified mail, return-receipt requested, to 
Mr Bryan W Cannon, Attorney at Law, 871 East 9400 
South, Sandy, Utah 84070, this 13th day of April, 
1999. 
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ADDENDUM 4 
1991 hand-written lease-option Agreement 
19 96 JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
1997 Court of Appeals MEMORANDUM DECISION 
1998 ORDER ["JUDGMENT"] 
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1 LAKE COUNTY 
BRYAN W. CANNON, #0561 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
40 East South Temple #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3500 
IN THE THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN A N D FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESLEY CLOCK AND ANN CLOCK, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHNF. GREEN AND LARUE 
GREEN, 
Defendants. 
ORDER & JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 960902949cv 
JUDGE WILKINSON 
This matter came on regularly before the above-entitled court pursuant to 
plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and defendant's Counter-Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Bryan W. Cannon appeared for the plaintiff at a hearing on the matter held 
Friday, August 16, 1996 at 10:00 a.m. The defendants were represented by Craig W. 
McArthur. Based upon the arguments of counsel, the memoranda submitted by the parties 
and the court being otherwise fully advised in the premises, the Court hereby finds that the 
Agreement is fully integrated with regard to the purchase price and the deadline date for 
exercise of the option. The plaintiffs attempted to exercise the option for the option price 
prior to the deadline date. Based upon the Court's finding, it is hereby ORDERED AND 
ADJUDGED as follows: 
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1. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and defendants 
Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
2. The plaintiffs, Wesley Clock and Anne Clock, are entitled to purchase 
the property at 1324 East 5485 South, Salt Lake City, Utah from defendants, John F. 
Green and Larue Green. 
3. The defendants shall upon receipt of $81,500.00 convey the said real 
property to the plaintiffs, Wesley Clock and Anne Clock. 
4. Against the purchase price the defendants have received $1,300.00 
toward the down payment thereon. The sum of $3,650.00 as additional down payment, 
now held by the court, shall be paid to defendants, John F. Green and Larue Green, and 
applied toward the purchase price, leaving a balance due thereon of $76,500.00. 
5. Any payments made by the plaintiffs to the defendants after August 
4,1996 shall also be applied to the purchase price. 
6. Closing of the purchase shall occur within a reasonable time after the 
entry of this order. Plaintiffs shall be obligated to set up and arrange at closing for the 
purchase and defendants shall be obligated to appear at the closing, upon reasonable 
notice to execute documents to transfer Wi\p. 
DATED this J day of -August, 1996. 
UDGE WILKlMSON 
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PArtP O OF O PAHFS 
FILED 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Wesley Clock and Ann Clock, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
v. 
John F. Green and Larue Green, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
OCT 0 2 1997 
COURT OF APPEALS 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 960797-CA 
F I L E D 
(October 2, 1997) 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, Division I 
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
Attorneys: David L. Grindstaff, Salt Lake City, for Appellants 
Bryan W. Cannon, Sandy, for Appellees 
Before Judges Davis, Billings, and Greenwood. 
DAVIS, Presiding Judge: 
We interpret the option contract as a matter of law because 
"the contract provision can be determined by the words of the 
agreement." Estate of Schmidt v. Downs, 775 P.2d 427, 430 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). Options contracts "must be exercised in 
accordance with [their] terms." Nance v. Schoonover. 521 P.2d 
896, 897 (Utah 1974), Here, the parties1 agreement does not 
describe a separate time by which the Clocks were to exercise 
their option. Yet "the failure to designate the time of payment 
does not make the contract a nullity." Ferris V, Jennings, 595 
p.2d 857, 860 (Utah 1979); see also ifofmann v. Sullivan/ 599 P.2d 
505, 508 (Utah 1979) (concluding contract lacking specific time 
of payment not fatally flawed where^ option price was fixed) . 
Rather, "options to purchase that fail to specify mode of 
exercise or time of payment must be read to require payment upon 
exercise," Mills v. Brody. 929 P.2d 360, 364 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996) . 
The Clocks provided a notice of intent to exercise the 
option in April 1996. Under the terms of the contract the Clocks 
had until August 5, 1996 to pay the balance of the $81,500. 
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Thus, the Greens breached the contract by refusing to sell the 
propparTS^ TNv Accordingly, the^yrder appealed from is affirmed. 
James/£.Davis 
Pr^kJCding Judj 
WE CONCUR: 
J u d i t h M. B i l l i ngs , Judge*" 
£g*» to*^ / 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
I, the undersig 
Appeals, do 
full, true and 
on file In t 
whereof, I 
the Court 
Date 
960797-CA 
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BRYAN W. CANNON, #0561 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Aspen Plaza 
871 East 9400 South 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
Telephone: (801) 255-7475 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
WESLEY CLOCK and ANN CLOCK, 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
JOHN F. GREEN and LARUE GREEN, ; 
Defendants. ] 
) ORDER 
i Civil No. 960902949 
1 JUDGE WILKINSON 
This matter came on regularly for hearing before the above entitled court on Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant's Motion for Contempt (a copy of which was not 
served upon plaintift). The court being fully advised on the premises and based upon the 
pleadings filed herein, hereby grants Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs are quieted in fee simple as to the following described real property 
commonly known as 1324 East 5485 South, Salt Lake City, Utah and more 
particulary described as follows: 
Lot 10, Olympus View Subdivision No. 3, according to the official 
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plat thereof as recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder. 
Said real property shall hereby be quieted in the plaintiffs, Wesley Clock and Ann 
Clock, upon their deposit of the sum of $76,500 plus the sum of $3,650 now held 
by the court with Surety Title Company. 
2. The sum of $3,650 now held by the court shall be released and made payable to 
Surety Title Company. 
3. The sums of $76,500 plus the $3,650 transferred by the court shall be held by 
Surety Title Company for the account of John F. Green and LaRue Green as the 
purchase price of the above described real property. 
4. The issue of sanctions for plaintiff against defendant shall be reserved for later 
determination. 
5. Evidence of the quieting of title in the plaintiffs shall be sufficient upon the 
recording of a notice by Surety Title Company evidencing the deposit of the funds 
required herein. 
In connection with Defendant's Motion for Contempt, the same is denied. However, 
plaintiffs are ordered to pay real property taxes from April \2y 1996 t6:date and water and sewer 
fees from July 29, 1991 to date. / *' - : ' 
DATED t h i s j ^ day of August, 1998. 
^ , ' • 
If ' ^3^ 
/ JODGE WIW&NSM 
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